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Teaching Comparative Religious Ethics -  
A Review Essay 
Kevin Schilbrack 
 
ABSTRACT - Though others have surveyed the different methods in comparative religious 
ethics, relatively little attention has been given to different approaches to pedagogy (exceptions 
include Lovin and Reynolds; Juergens-meyer; Twiss). The field of comparative religious ethics 
has now reached a level of maturity so that there are a variety of ways such courses can be 
taught. In this review I consider the approaches to comparative religious ethics found in four 
recent texts by Jacob Neusner, Darrell Fasching and Dell deChant, Regina Wolfe and Christine 
Gudorf, and Sumner Twiss and Bruce Grelle. In the essay I note the strengths and weaknesses 
of each text, with special attention given to how the texts might work in the classroom. I then 
argue that the different texts reflect different understandings of the goal of teaching comparative 
religious ethics, and I make these goals explicit in order to help teachers decide how they might 
approach the teaching in this growing field. 
 
 
 
1. A Compare and Contrast Approach  
Though the field of comparative religious ethics is still relatively new, if one can say that 
something represents the "meat and potatoes" of the field, this handy trilogy edited by Jacob 
Neusner and entitled Comparing Religious Traditions is it. The three volumes cover three foci: 
"The Ethics of Family Life," "Making an Honest Living," and "The Life of [Personal] Virtue." The 
volumes investigate each focus from the perspectives of the world religions of Judaism, 
Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism, and the chapters are authored by specialists in the 
given traditions. Each chapter of each volume is also organized by the same five straightforward 
questions. Each chapter in the volume on the ethics of the family, for example, asks about what 
husbands and wives owe one another, what parents owe their children, what children owe their 
parents,what happens when the family breaks down, and unconventional, supernatural families. 
There is an autonomy to the books so that a class could use any one volume independently of 
the others, and there is also an autonomy to the chapters so that a class, say, on Islam, could 
create a section on Islamic ethics by using the chapters on Islam.  
The chapters draw primarily on scriptures and classical texts. The quotations are often 
generous, sometimes a page or two long, and give readers a taste of the originals. Each 
chapter then ends with short comments from the scholars of the other four traditions that note 
similarities and differences between the different ethical views of family, work, and selfhood 
(hence my section heading). Though these commentaries often bring to light surprising 
agreements and disagreements between the traditions, they are disappointingly short—
sometimes only a paragraph or two long.  
Even apart form the closing commentaries, however, the structured form of the texts makes 
comparisons between religious ethical traditions easy. I only saw two examples in which one 
contributor was not on the same page as the others. The first is Bruce Chilton's chapter in 
Making an Honest Living, which compares the worldviews of gnostic and orthodox Christianity 
while the other chapters in the book focus more specifically on religious teachings concerning 
proper vocations or wages. The second is that, while the volumes as a whole are very clear-
eyed on the patriarchy of the traditions, Tamara Sonn's chapter in The Ethics of Family Life is at 
pains to stress that the Qur'an is egalitarian. The other authors do not apologize for the 
traditions they describe, but she explains explicit inequalities between the sexes as the result of 
the historical context (for example, 2001a, 72, 73, 77). In a rare critical comment, Bruce Chilton 
calls her to task for this, rightly saying that "[i]f there were some method for determining what 
the balance between revelation and history is in a particular case, it would be good to know 
what it might be" (2001b, 85).  
 
2. A Narrative Approach  
The landscape is very different in Darreil Fasching and Dell deChant's Comparative Religious 
Ethics: A Narrative Approach. Fasching and deChant approach the study of comparative 
religious ethics with the conviction that "an important spiritual and ethical path for a new 
millennium is emerging," a global ethic that they call "the way of all the earth" (3-4). The easy 
optimism of the modern age has passed, they argue, and Auschwitz and Hiroshima have 
become the formative religious events of our post/modern world. In this present context, they do 
not shy from the normative task of endorsing some religious ethical views and criticizing others, 
arguing that "[t]he study of ethics must be more than an "objective" survey of abstract theories 
taught in noncommittal fashion. It ought to convey the wisdom one generation has to pass on to 
the next" (4).  
As the subtitle suggests, their approach is through storytelling and for each of the world religions 
they provide at least one classical and one contemporary story. They begin with the stories of 
Gilgamesh and of Socrates and then turn to the Hindu stories of Arjuna and of Gandhi, the 
Buddhist stories of Siddartha Gautama and of Thich Nhat Hanh, the Jewish stories of Job and 
of Abraham Heschel, the Christian stories of the gospel of Matthew and of Martin Luther King, 
Jr., the Islamic stories of Muhammad and of Malcolm X, and then close with stories of the 
feminists Joanna Macy and Rosemary Radford Ruether.  
As I noted above, this text is distinctive in that it approaches comparative religious ethics as a 
normative enterprise. The norm the authors propose for assessing religious ethics is their quite 
original invention of a distinction between the traditionally synonymous concepts of "the sacred" 
and "the holy." Taking these concepts from phenomenologists and sociologists of religion but 
developing them as evaluative tools, Fasching and deChant propose that religious experiences 
are not all the same. On the one hand, the experience of "the sacred" leads to the sacralization 
of a given territory, the people who live there, and their way of life. A sacred society thus lives 
according to a vision of a sacred order that is typically ethnocentric and hierarchical. From this 
perspective, one who is like us is good; one who is unlike us—the stranger—is seen as not fully 
human, a challenge, and a threat. The morality that develops from this experience of "the 
sacred" typically focuses on one's status and honor and it gives rise to a spirituality that stifles 
questions and insists on an ethics of obedience. As Fasching and deChant put it, from this 
perspective the way things ought to be is the way things are. On the other hand, however, the 
experience of "the holy" is an experience of the infinite and the infinite cannot be represented. It 
is not "like us" but rather wholly other. For this reason, from this religious perspective, no 
particular place, people, or way of life is considered sacred. In fact, to bring the world into 
accord with the holy perpetually calls into question the status quo; the way things are forever 
falls short of the way they ought to be. Such a perspective gives rise to a spirituality that actually 
fosters doubt and questioning. Hospitality is extended to the stranger as a representative of the 
divine Other.  
This distinction between a sacred morality and an ethic of the holy is certain to be the most 
controversial aspect of the book. Let us set aside (until Part V, below) the question whether the 
study of comparative religious ethics should move beyond description to the assessment of 
religious ways of life and for now focus on the question of how Fasching and deChant use this 
distinction to assess them. Fasching and deChant argue that their categories of "the sacred" 
and "the holy" are not meant to separate the religions that are truly ethical from those that are 
merely moral, but rather name two tendencies present in every religious tradition— indeed, 
tendencies present in every person. In my judgment, that is the kind of criterion the discipline of 
comparative religious ethics wants most. Nevertheless, the question that is sure to remain is 
whether this distinction can be used fairly.  
Here are two ways in which the sacred/holy distinction (despite the authors' intention) might be 
biased in favor of certain religions and against others. First, if sacred societies tend to sacralize 
the cosmos and have a this-worldly orientation (18), then one wonders whether certain 
religions—say, indigenous religions or Chinese religions, neither of which is treated in this 
book—have enough of the "other-worldly" dimension to avoid being seen as anything but 
limited. Second, Fasching and deChant regularly say that sacred societies seek to legitimate 
themselves by reference to the way things are, whereas holy communities found themselves 
upon an ineffable experience, an experience not '"of some 'thing,' but of a 'lack' or 'absence' that 
opens us up to seeing and acting on new possibilities" (19). The impression given is that 
religious metaphysical traditions naturally connect in some way to the sacred morality that is 
hostile to the stranger (e.g., 146, 166) and apophatic traditions naturally connect in some way to 
the ethic of the holy. But surely not only sacred communities but also holy communities typically 
see themselves as in accord with the nature of things and, like all groups, have sought to 
legitimate themselves. Or should we assume that all religious teachings about the nature of 
things are just rationalizations of the status quo?  
These concerns aside, this book is terrific at permitting layers and layers of analysis. The 
authors begin with the story of Gilgamesh in order to argue that the rise of cities led people for 
the first time to live among strangers, which in turn called into question traditional, tribal 
understandings of morality, mortality, and meaning. This opens a class to a nest of existentialist 
issues. There is also consistent attention given to the "cosmic story" that each tradition has to 
tell, so those who agree with Clifford Geertz that religions usually wed an ethos to a 
metaphysical world view can take the conversation in that direction. The stories of the five 
twentieth-century figures contrasts the nonviolent "children of Gandhi" with Malcolm X as a 
proponent of the just war tradition. And the closing chapter on feminist audacity and the ethic of 
interdependence raises Carol Gilligan's work on gender in ethics and calls into question the 
usually unquestioned religious theme of killing or emptying the self.  
Surprisingly, the book does not really make much of the idea of telling a story (nor are the many 
"stories" they tell told as stories). The authors assume that "the primary way in which ethical 
insights occur and are communicated within religious traditions is through story and ritual rather 
than through theory" (5) and surely they are right. But what does it mean to think with a text, to 
embody a narrative, or to see oneself in a story? (On such questions, see for example Clooney, 
1989,1990.) The role of narrative in ethics is barely explored. Moreover, Fasching and deChant 
state that "the meaning of a story is shaped by the narrative imagination of its listener and the 
narrative imagination of the listener is shaped by his or her own religious experience" (130), but 
why stop there? Why is religious experience not in turn shaped—precisely by narrative? Insofar 
as this approach resists making the linguistic turn and seeks to ground its norm on experiential 
universale, it is to that extent really modernist rather than post-modernist (see also 51 for the 
difference between the hyphen and the slash in "post/modern").  
Another weakness is that there is a fuzziness of vocabulary. For example, Fasching and 
deChant want to praise what they call audacity and which they exemplify in the story of Jacob 
wrestling with God. But when they point out that Gilgamesh also "wrestles" with Enkidu and 
Jacob "wrestles" with Esau in the womb, "wrestle" seems to mean not audacity but that the two 
struggled to live together; physical combat represents a power struggle. And again, when they 
say that Abraham "wrestled" with God over the fate of Sodom, they seem to mean that he made 
ethical demands upon or bargained with God, which does not fit the wrestling of Gilgamesh with 
Enkidu or of Jacob with Esau. And again, when they say that the Buddha "wrestled" with the 
four famous sights of the old person, the sick person, the corpse, and the renunciant, they 
cannot mean either that there was a power struggle or that he made demands of them; they 
seem to mean that the Buddha struggled to understand their significance. Perhaps there is 
some sense of wrestle that is generic enough to include all these uses (perhaps "struggle to 
come to terms with"?), but my complaint is pedagogical: I cannot ask students to analyze 
religious stories using this concept if "wrestling" (and by implication, audacity) is used this 
broadly.  
Despite these caveats, this is an original, eloquent, and often powerful book that can take a 
class to important and profound issues. Many may want to combine this text with more 
theoretical pieces on narrative and ethics or narrative and religious ethics (for example, Hallisey 
and Hansen; Barbieri). Teachers who want to develop the idea of a cosmic story might want to 
combine it with recent work in the story of the universe (for example, Rue; Swimme and Berry). 
Those who want to call attention to the social, political, and economic forces that lead a society 
to develop one religious narrative rather than another could use Bruce Lincoln (for example, 
Lincoln 1989, 2000).  
 
3. A Case Studies Approach  
A completely different strategy for teaching comparative religious ethics is found in Regina 
Wentzel Wolfe and Christine Gudorfs Ethicsand World Religions: Cross-Cultural Case Studies. 
This volume uses eighteen original case studies in order to explore ethical issues faced by 
people in diverse cultural and religious contexts. The case studies are each about six pages 
long and each one presents a "real life" ethical dilemma. In fact, as ethical dilemmas go, each of 
these is a gem, a tangle of obligations and consequences. To take just one example, the case 
study entitled "An Unlikely Donor" describes a British nurse (who is Christian) who learns that 
one of her patients (who is Turkish, Muslim, and speaks no English) has come to England to sell 
one of his kidneys in an arrangement with one of the surgeons in her hospital. Each case study 
lets readers eavesdrop as families, co-workers, and friends weigh their choices and agonize 
over their conflicts. Even better, many of the cases give the reader a sense of the powers and 
limitations of the relevant institutions, for example, a chavurah of rabbis in New York debating 
U.S. and Jewish divorce laws, a village meeting in Nigeria considering a new model for 
development, an international team of WHO physicians investigating how few mentally retarded 
children live to adulthood in the Andean highlands, or a panel from the Florida Foster Care 
Citizen Review Program discussing adopted children who may be HIV-positive.  
Each case study is then followed by two commentaries that explore the case from two different 
religious perspectives. These commentaries present the resources that a particular religious 
tradition has to offer and suggest ways to resolve the problem. Here one sees the diversity of 
comparative religious ethics at its most impressive. Though one of almost every pair of 
responses is from some form of Christianity, the responses also include not just different forms 
of Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism, but also Native American, Baha'i, Vodou, 
Confucian, Yoruban, and Aymaran Christian perspectives.  
Some of these commentaries are very to the point and recommend that the characters in the 
case studies need to take specific religious virtues or principles into account. (Gudorf s own 
responses to the cases fall into this category.) Other commentaries are more tender-footed or 
get stuck in platitudes. A Buddhist commentary, for example, gives a woman considering in vitro 
fertilization the unhelpful advice that "[i]n a world where lives are inexorably intertwined, like ice 
and water, our concern should be extended to all beings. Essentially, we should focus our 
energies where we can make a difference rather than trying to embrace all lives and 
relationships" (329). Leaving aside the theoretical problem that the two statements contradict 
each other, one is struck by the practical problem that neither one seems to lead the character 
in any direction. Yet this too is a teachable moment, and we can ask students to be not only led 
by the responses but also to evaluate them. The most fascinating aspect of this book, however, 
may be the interplay between the two responses. For example, the Jewish response to a 
Japanese businessman who suspects that he is being asked by his company to participate in 
securities fraud sees a clear violation of traditional Jewish ethical norms for business, whereas 
the Buddhist response does not speak of violations or norms at all but focuses instead on 
transforming a self-centered understanding and thereby transforming one's motivations.  
In my experience, the case studies and responses do a terrific job of drawing students in. Faced 
with these cases, students see clearly the relevance and the challenge of comparing religious 
ethics. Nevertheless, such an approach puts special demands on the teacher. One practical 
issue is that the stories are so complex that classroom discussion threatens to over-simplify 
them. One case study that considers female circumcision asks readers to weigh the 
relationships of mother to daughter, wife to husband, wife to mother-in-law, husband to 
employer, and Senegalese to Islam, but in class the details may fall away so one refers to just 
"the FGM case." For the classroom, I recommend that teachers make a habit of reminding 
students of the details of the case, perhaps by having the class begin the discussion by listing 
the names and interests of the different characters. Referring to "Awa," "Joseph," etc., will help 
students see that, unlike in a typical discussion in philosophical ethics, the issue is not solely the 
morality or immorality of a particular act but rather the solution to a moral difficulty that pulls in a 
variety of directions.  
A more significant teaching problem is the danger that classroom discussions will get mired in 
the plurality and ambiguity of the case studies. Precisely because the ethical dilemmas are 
presented not as simple "lifeboaf'-style choices but as realistic situations full of complexities, 
readers will get a sense of the extent to which an ethical decision is not settled simply by "what 
the religion teaches" but also turns on personality, cultural context, and an individual's 
interpretation of her situation. Some teachers of religious ethics will welcome this move away 
from principles. As Wolfe and Gudorf write, "The structure of this book reflects postmodernity's 
rejection of a deductive method of presenting religions by focusing on sacred texts, creeds, or 
codes" (3). It is worth noting, however, what this means in the classroom. If one person 
concludes that the character in the case study should do one thing and another concludes that 
the character should do something completely different, there is little hope that one of these will 
emerge as the "right" answer—or even that one of these can show itself as the right answer 
from the perspective of a single religious tradition. Better and worse answers will need to be 
judged on their sensitivity or profundity. This is not a bad thing, of course, nor need it suggest 
any relativism, but it is much more difficult to assess and some teachers and students may find 
themselves frustrated by it.  
As for including this book on one's syllabus, one weakness of this book, though hardly 
avoidable, is that there is so little information on the particular traditions. For instance, there are 
about two pages on Hinduism in the introduction, and the two Hindu responses say a word 
about Hindu ideas like ahimsa and karma, but students who try to get a sense of what Hindu 
ethics involves from these pages alone will be grasping at straws. Teachers will therefore 
probably want to supplement this volume with information about the history and content of 
specific religious ethical traditions. Some might do this with religious texts that make explicit 
ethical recommendations, like the Dhammapada or the Laws of Manu. A successful class might 
also follow Wolfe and Gudorf s lead by avoiding an over-emphasis on creeds and codes, for 
example, by using texts that focus on the development of the self, like Augustine's Confessions 
or N. Scott Momaday's The Way to Rainy Mountain.  
 
4. A Hermeneutical-Dialogical Approach  
The insight that guides Sumner Twiss and Bruce Grelle's Explorations in Global Ethics: 
Comparative Religious Ethics and Interreligious Dialogue is that those who study comparative 
religious ethics and those involved in interreligious dialogue have overlooked a potentially 
mutually beneficial relationship. Each side possesses something the other lacks. The field of 
comparative religious ethics struggles to find a rationale for its practice that will persuade people 
that the study is more than an ivory tower pursuit; what concrete good is accomplished by 
comparing religious ethics? Those involved in interreligious dialogue do not have this problem; 
they have a rationale. Since at least the 1893 World's Parliament of Religions, representatives 
of the world's major religious traditions who have engaged in interfaith or interreligious dialogue 
have debated substantive moral issues. But they have the problem that they seem to impose 
Western modes of thought on the rest of the world. To marry these two fields would bring 
theoretical sophistication together with practical commitment. "So we are confronted with a 
problematic and provocative situation. On the one hand, we have an area of scholarly inquiry—
comparative religious ethics—which, despite its sophisticated tools and methods, appears to 
lack a unifying rationale and purpose convincing to those within and outside the field. On the 
other hand, we have a community of interreligious dialogue with an enormously persuasive 
rationale and mission that nonetheless tends to founder in its ability to mount convincing and 
nonparochial positions and arguments" (2).  
In Part I of the book (which is, loosely, on theory and method), Sumner Twiss surveys a variety 
of courses in comparative religious ethics and defends what he calls the hermeneutical-
dialogical curricular paradigm (an approach to teaching that cries out for a catchier label). Bruce 
Grelle argues that, despite the insularity of the academy today, comparative religious ethicists 
are well placed to recover a sense of citizenship and a vocation as public intellectuals. Kate 
McCarthy provides an overview and an assessment of the exclusivist, inclusivist, and pluralist 
models of interreligious dialogue that is one of the clearest and most insightful pieces on the 
question I have read. Sallie B. King calls to the attention of comparative religious ethicists the 
Global Ethic written by Hans Küng and issued by the Parliament of the World's Religions in 
1993 and eloquently summarizes its significance for comparative religious ethics. The section 
then closes with a commentary on these papers by Marcus Braybrooke.  
Part II of the book (loosely, on practice) explores seven substantive, contemporary moral 
issues. Twiss gives a comparative perspective on religion and human rights, arguing that 
human rights are not solely a Western concern. James Smuri writes on Buddhist, Christian, and 
Muslim strategies for dealing with the problem of distributive justice. June O'Connor writes on 
the value of the testimonies of resistance written by Third World authors. John Kelsay writes 
from a personal context on the implications of Islamic teachings on war and statecraft for 
Christian theology. Ronald Green describes the recent emergence of a global ethic among 
international businesses and illustrates some of its relationships to community and religion in 
the case of Japan. Kusumita P. Pederson provides a handsome survey of resources for 
environmental ethics in world religions. And Darreil Fasching gives an autobiographical account 
of how he has come to use narrative ethics to negotiate discussions of genocide in a relativistic 
age. Part II closes with a commentary on these papers by Dennis McCann that includes some 
trenchant criticisms, especially of O'Connor and Fasching.  
Although the papers in this volume are consistently well done, the ones that are most explicitly 
relevant to the question of teaching comparative religious ethics are those by Twiss and Grelle 
defending what they call a hermeneutical-dialogical approach. Twiss makes the case for this 
teaching approach by developing a typology and a critique of curricular paradigms, an overview 
of the field that is necessary reading for those who teach comparative religious ethics. Grelle 
argues for the same curricular model by placing it into a larger view of the role of the teacher of 
comparative religious ethics as a public intellectual.  
What does this hermeneutical-dialogical model entail? As both Twiss and Grelle put it, the 
hermeneutical-dialogical approach "seeks to cultivate an accurate and an empathetic 
understanding and appreciation of religious ethical traditions as the basis for the more primary 
goal of developing students' disciplined thinking about a topic of existential or practical moral 
significance79 (45, emphasis in original; this sentence is repeated almost verbatim by Twiss, 17). 
In other words, the primary goal in such classes (not unlike a philosophical course in applied 
ethics) is disciplined thinking about a specific moral problem like racism, the  environment, or 
homelessness, but the resolution of the problem involves an accurate and empathetic 
understanding of diverse religious positions. The idea in short, then, is that classes in 
comparative religious ethics might emulate those interreligious dialogues in which members of 
different religious ethical traditions come together to study a problem and work out a solution 
that is acceptable to all sides.  
In my judgment, such courses would help students develop a powerful combination of 
intellectual skills and could offer them invaluable practice for conflict resolution in a pluralistic 
world. One of the strengths of such courses is that, unlike many courses that imply or assert 
that there is no way of adjudicating conflicts between religious ethical ideals, such courses 
make the shared problem and the need for adjudication the starting point. Though I am 
persuaded by the case made for the hermeneutical-dialogical approach, I do have what might 
be called two recommendations for it. First, the idea of bringing people together from different 
religious traditions—along with the language of dialogue and mini-parliaments—is great. But the 
Gadamerian language that the members of different religions aim at "fusing their horizons" is 
vague at best and may suggest that on this model the different religions become one, a 
suggestion that (as King, Grelle, and McCarthy point out) is likely to alienate many religious 
people. Twiss offers some alternative formulations for this process of fusion: "normative 
appropriation" in that the model encourages students to appropriate aspects of the traditions 
with which they dialogue or "transformation of view" (17; cf. 29, fn. 3). But to my ears these 
formulations exacerbate the problem. It may be true in one sense that to enter into dialogue with 
another is necessarily to be transformed, but (to borrow a phrase from Kate McCarthy) such 
formulations suggest that the hermeneutical-dialogical approach fails to grant the particular 
religious identities a priority over dialogue (108). There is a need to describe the nature of 
coming-to-dialogue in such a way as not to suggest a "globalist" or "one world" religious or 
political agenda (cf. 51).  
My second worry is that the hermeneutical-dialogical approach (at least in the context of this 
collection of essays) can encourage a onesided view of the nature of religion. Recall that the 
approach asks those involved to identify a shared problem and then to investigate the different 
religious resources for addressing it. The implication is that "the world" has problems—perhaps 
in large part because of its materialism or lack of spirituality—but that religions, though ignored, 
have different means to combat the problems. The authors of this book, including the authors of 
the papers that have exactly this structure, no doubt have no illusions about the potential in 
religions for evil. But there is not enough discussion of the ways in which religions are implicated 
in power and as such may be a cause or continuing source of such problems. One thinks, for 
example, of religious justifications for economic injustices or religious complicity in ethnic or 
racial violence. This volume, of course, seeks to show the relevance of comparative religious 
ethics and interreligious dialogue to each other, and perhaps in that context the working 
assumption is that the parties in dialogue may be religious representatives who are seeking to 
solve problems and therefore the important thing is to get them to appreciate each other's 
viewpoints and solutions. But the classroom should have a greater appreciation of the darker 
aspects of religions as represented, for example, in the volume by Fasching and deChant.  
 
5. Pedagogy  
The comments above were intended to distinguish these four approaches to comparative 
religious ethics and to shine some light on some of the strengths and weaknesses, especially in 
regards to their teachability. But these books represent different choices for teaching 
comparative religious ethics not solely because they include different facts or employ different 
methods, but also—I want now to argue—because they reflect different pedagogical goals. I do 
not want to exaggerate this point. All of these books share the defining goal of comparative 
religious ethics: to help students think more clearly about religious diversity on moral matters. 
Moreover, all of these books share to a greater or lesser extent each other's goals of providing 
accurate information, developing students' powers of moral empathy, fostering critical ethical 
thinking, and encouraging practical engagement. Nevertheless, these books rank these goals 
differently and I believe that it is fair to say that the differences between these texts reflect 
decisions the authors have made about what kind of students they want to see come out of 
comparative religious ethics classes. In short, the books hold implicit pedagogical goals. I now 
turn to these goals and will try to make them explicit.  
The primary goal of Neusner's trilogy on Comparing Religious Traditions is simply to share 
accurate information about the ethical traditions. These books do not explicitly raise the 
practical, hermeneutic, or normative issues with the force of the other volumes considered here. 
A drawback of this trilogy is that its lecture-like style and repeated structure may lead students 
to treat each religious tradition as monolithic. But the dissemination of accurate information is 
not only a legitimate goal of comparative religious ethics classes; it is a condition for the 
success of any other goals. The other texts discussed in this essay consider other goals primary 
and for this reason they are limited in the information they give students about particular 
religious traditions. Thus if teaching comparative religious ethics is not to be superficial, it will 
typically require the kind of sustained attention to the particularities of religious traditions that is 
supplied by this trilogy. 
 
Fasching and deChant's approach seeks to encourage teachers of comparative religious ethics 
to see their proper tasks in the classroom as not only description and analysis but also 
constructive, normative argument. The primary goal of their volume is to get students to ask the 
question of how we ought to live. Put more strongly, their goal is not simply to help students 
appreciate or empathetically understand differences between traditions, but to provide them with 
tools to help them distinguish religious ethical teachings that are healing from those that are 
poisonous. Thus this book raises the question whether teachers of comparative religious ethics 
should engage in advocacy. The question is not new, but Fasching and deChant emphasize 
that today we teach in a context of cultural and ethical relativism. "To leave the next generation 
with no wisdom in an age as dangerous as ours is to create a cynical generation that believes 
there are no standards, and so one view of life is thought to be as good as one another" (4; see 
also the chapter by Fasching in Twiss and Grelle).  
If I can say a word in support of this understanding of comparative religious ethics, it is worth 
noting that in a typical class on philosophical ethics, students not only compare and contrast the 
positions of Mill and Kant and Aristotle but also evaluate them and argue that some help us 
flourish while others are flawed or inadequate. This is not merely "advocacy," but rather an 
intellectually valuable aspect of studying ethics in the sense that the students of ethics who 
engage in normative argument learn skills (like the evaluation of the cogency of religious ethical 
positions) that those who eschew evaluation do not. In fact, unless the teacher assumes that the 
religious ethical positions really cannot be argued for (a presupposition often held in religious 
studies), it seems strange to exclude discussion of how one might do this.  
Moreover, in considering Fasching and deChant's proposal that we should construct classrooms 
that challenge relativism and enable normative argument, it is important to see how academia is 
an institution that plays an integral role in reproducing capitalist practices of production and 
consumption. As Mark D. Wood has argued, corporations today commodify diversity, including 
religious diversity, and they seek employees who are able to expand and manage markets 
across cultures. Ancient religious practices, so the catalogues in my mail tell me, are good for 
relieving stress and for heightening my sexual enjoyment. In this light, classes that compare 
religious ways of life that encourage relativism, religious pluralism, and multiculturalism can 
represent "an education appropriate for empire" (Wood 148; cf. Surin). If such classes are to 
contribute to campaigns for social justice, they "must break with corporate-sponsored, liberal-
pluralist versions of multiculturalism that abstract the study of religion and culture from struggles 
over power and reduce the ethical project of religious studies to learning how to appreciate 
different ways of being spiritual" (Wood 130). Lee Yearley's observations about relativistic styles 
of teaching comparative religious ethics nicely support this claim from a psychological point of 
view, as he argues that such courses help college students who are or hope to become 
members of the bourgeoisie to justify "a 'status quo' in themselves" (Yearley 166). In sum, then, 
Fasching and deChant's pedagogical goal of helping students assess religious ethical claims 
may be, to use their own term, "audacious." But the actual evaluations that they offer are not 
imperialistic but tentative (for an example, see their use of Gandhi to critique Thich Nhat Hanh 
[161-3]), and can serve students as fine illustrations of how to engage cross-cultural ethical 
arguments.  
Though Wolfe and Gudorf's text certainly includes a wealth of information about different 
religious ethical traditions and also can help students develop their cognitive abilities in the 
analysis and argument of ethical issues, the book has a different primary goal. Their book is the 
most pluralistic of these four approaches, the least likely to lead students to think of any tradition 
as monolithic. I believe that this reflects their primary goal of helping students develop 
empathetic understanding of what it is like to confront moral dilemmas as a member of another 
religion. Better than any other approach considered here, the case studies approach 
encourages students to imaginatively step into another's situation and to think through ethical 
issues from the perspective of people in circumstances unlike their own. Because the case 
studies do not simply present information but introduce characters who get into dire straits, 
Wolfe and Gudorf actually employ story-telling in a way that Fasching and deChant do not. The 
use of case studies, as I noted, also runs the risk of leaving readers with the sense that 
everything about comparative religious ethics is ambiguous and that conclusions turn largely on 
one's personality. But there will be some teachers for whom a decreased attention to moral 
codes, an increased recognition of the interdisciplinary nature of comparative work, and, yes, an 
appreciation of ambiguity will be welcome.  
The goal of Twiss and Grelle's book is to connect the academic work and methods of reflection 
found in comparative religious ethics to actual communities working to listen to marginalized 
people, to relieve poverty, to protect the environment, and in general "to call the world to shared 
responsibility for the alleviation of suffering and oppression" (2). Though all the texts considered 
here seek to have an effect on students' moral practice at least implicitly, that is this book's 
primary aim.  
In this context it is worth returning to Grelle's proposal that comparative religious ethicists can 
and should develop themselves as public intellectuals. Grelle criticizes the professionalization 
and specialization that has led to the decline in public intellectual activity among academics, and 
he argues that comparative religious ethics can become a new, socially responsible field (like 
women's studies, environmental studies, and African American studies) where academic and 
public goals intersect. He proposes first that, within the university, the activities of teaching and 
writing can contribute to the search for practical strategies for addressing moral issues in the 
contemporary world. One's teaching can contribute if teachers "think more explicitly about how 
the content and style of their teaching is related to their own and their students' responsibilities 
as citizens" (41), for example, by employing the hermeneutical-dialogical approach described 
above. One's writing and research can also contribute, if academics can find the ability and the 
will to speak in a language that is intelligible to their fellow citizens. Second, Grelle proposes 
that, outside the university, comparative religious ethicists can contribute to the interfaith 
movement and they can help to integrate the study of religion into the public schools in a 
responsible way by helping schools become familiar with the relevant constitutional principles, 
by teaching teachers about religions and how they are studied, and by helping to develop 
curricular materials. Others have claimed that the study of religious ethics can itself be a moral 
praxis; Grelle's reasonable and clear proposals show what that claim can mean in concrete 
terms.  
Grelle is right that professors often fail to see that their work as teachers can serve a common 
good, and his vision of comparative religious ethicists as public citizens can be a powerful 
source of renewal. If I can add to this vision, however, there is little discussion by Grelle of the 
value of explaining religions in terms of their social or economic causes. As Judith Plaskow has 
said, "students should be encouraged ... not only to bring 'religious resources to bear on 
important social problems' but also to bring critical theory to bear on religious ideas, institutions, 
and practices that conflict with the practical realization of democracy, equality, and justice" 
(quoted in Wood 157). This lack of critique of religion is inappropriate for public intellectuals, 
including religious public intellectuals. Moreover, Grelle's model of "citizenship" can in some 
situations blunt one's moral imagination and praxis—as Grelle himself might agree. "The goal, in 
other words, ought not to be one of [becoming or] helping students become 'good citizens', a 
goal that guides many of the scholars associated with the service learning movement, but, 
rather, to become, to borrow [Martin Luther] King's more productive formulation, 'creatively 
maladjusted', 'transformed non-conformists'" (Wood 152). In the end, however, the greatest 
strength of Twiss and Grelle's hermeneutical-dialogical approach to teaching comparative 
religious ethics is that it does not exclude those who are creatively maladjusted. On the 
contrary, it provides a procedure for the most diverse communities to overcome their lack of 
understanding of their neighbors in order to think and act together on the problems they share. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
